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Truglio: Compulsory Licensing of Patents

COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS IN TIMES OF
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
Kelsey Truglio*
ABSTRACT
In March 2020, the United States shut down to avoid the
continued spread of the COVID-19 virus as it spread globally. In
December 2020, the first COVID-19 vaccines were granted emergency
usage authorization in the United States. Wealthy nations were able to
quickly purchase and hoard vaccines for public distribution, leaving
many third-world countries and developing nations struggling to
continue to survive the pandemic without vaccination.
Compulsory licensing should be allowed on otherwise patented
or patentable new technology in times of global health emergency,
regardless of which entity creates the technology. This will enable
governments of countries spanning all wealth levels to manufacture
and distribute technology without the obstacles of the high cost of
paying the full royalty rate to the patent owner or an excessive wait
period while the patent’s monopoly period runs.
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INTRODUCTION

Moderna and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), once
partners in the invention of a COVID-19 vaccine, are now warring in
court over its long term distribution rights, management, and potential
billions of dollars in profits.1 The court’s decision in this patent dispute
will set a precedent that will change the way private companies
collaborate with the United States government in the future.2 In filing
its COVID-19 vaccine patent, Moderna only credited its own scientists
for the invention, allegedly leaving out three NIH scientists who
critically collaborated with the private pharmaceutical company. 3
Several NIH scientists contributed to the creation of the Moderna
mRNA vaccine after a four-year collaboration between Moderna and
the NIH, the United States government’s biomedical research agency. 4
The exclusion allegedly blindsided the NIH. 5 However, Moderna now
asserts that its scientists were the sole creators of the vaccine, and
therefore, filed its vaccine patent application to reflect that assertion.
This ongoing patent dispute persists while millions are still
unvaccinated against COVID-19 around the world and populations are
still struggling to combat the disease and its effects – including
widespread death and instances of long-term illness. During public
health emergencies, the global community needs to follow a
* Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2023; Stony
Brook University M.A. in Bioethics, Medical Humanities, and Compassionate Care,
2018; Stony Brook University B.S. in Biology, 2016. Many thanks to my faculty
advisor Professor Rena Seplowitz, my Notes Editors, Katherine Carroll and Michele
Abatangelo, and the rest of the Law Review staff that took the time to read and
improve my writing. Thank you to my family and friends that have been by my side
through my law school experience. I would like to specifically thank my mother,
Rose, for teaching me how to write effectively and passionately. Finally, to my
husband Michael, thank you for being my biggest supporter in life – I would not be
where I am today without you.
1
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Rebecca Robbins, Moderna & U.S. Odds Over Vaccine Pat.
Rts., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2021 (updated Nov. 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/09/us/moderna-vaccine-patent.html;
Julie
Steenhuysen, Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine Pat. Disp. Headed Ct., REUTERS (Nov.
11,
2021
2:07
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcarepharmaceuticals/moderna-covid-19-vaccine-patent-dispute-headed-court-us-nihhead-says-2021-11-10/.
2
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; Steenhuysen, supra note 1.
3
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; Steenhuysen, supra note 1.
4
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1.
5
Id.
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consistent, efficient, and collaborative system to waive patent
protections and prioritize innovation and distribution of treatments,
vaccinations, and other life-saving technologies.
Despite its surface appearance, the Moderna lawsuit is not
merely a petty squabble over who will get credit for the vaccine. 6 The
main issue is the lasting and possibly devastating impact this could
have on vaccine access moving forward, both domestically and
internationally.7 If the patent application is approved the way it is,
Moderna will have a developmental monopoly on the COVID-19
vaccine, not only collecting royalties on sales but also controlling and
managing the production, distribution, and licensing of the vaccination
technology.8 If Moderna credited the NIH, the government agency
would likely not need Moderna’s permission to license the vaccine to
other companies or organizations for mass production and
distribution.9 With this stake in ownership, the NIH could secure
national access to at least one type of vaccine which has been proven
effective against COVID-19.10 Without the stake, there are other
alternatives - but none of them as assured as credit on the patent itself.11
Although Moderna has publicly announced that it will not
exercise patent rights during the pandemic period, it may change its
mind at any time with virtually no consequence or restrictions imposed
by governments or the market. 12 That is where compulsory licensing
presents a solution. A compulsory license from the government would
provide firm legal reassurance to government officials and
manufacturers to allow vaccine production after the pandemic
emergency period.13 A license would add a force of law behind
Moderna’s promise.
The process of compulsory licensing for patents in the public
health field should be changed to address a wider scope of major health
6

Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; Steenhuysen, supra note 1.
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; Steenhuysen, supra note 1.
8
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; Steenhuysen, supra note 1.
9
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1; MODERNA, STATEMENT BY MODERNA ON
INTELL. PROP. MATTERS DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC (Oct. 2020),
https://investors.modernatx.com/Statements--Perspectives/Statements-Perspectives-Details/2020/Statement-by-Moderna-on-Intellectual-PropertyMatters-during-the-COVID-19-Pandemic/default.aspx.
13
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1.
7
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problems. Specifically, the requirements that compulsory licenses can
only be issued after a government has attempted to convince a patent
holder to issue a voluntary license, and then only to meet a specific
emergency and for specific periods of time, is no longer appropriate
for a post-COVID-19-pandemic world. We now see that some public
health issues do not dissipate as quickly as expected or hoped by the
public. As of the current date, there are over ten named COVID-19
variants in existence, with BA.5 making up more than 50% of cases in
the United States as of the beginning of July 2022. 14
This Note will argue that compulsory licensing should be
allowed on otherwise patented or patentable new technology in times
of medical emergency, regardless of which entity, private or
government, creates the technology. This will enable governments of
low income, middle, and high-income countries to manufacture and
distribute these innovations without the obstacles of the cost of paying
the full royalty rate to the patent owner or an excessive wait period
while the patent’s monopoly period runs. Allowing such compulsory
licensing will permit governments to address public health issues
continuously and respond to emergencies and health issues quickly.
Without trying to predict how long an emergency will last, more lives
may be preserved and a more equitable approach to public health on
14

CTR. DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION, Delta Variant, (updated Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/delta-variant.html;
CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION, Omicron Variant, (updated Dec. 20, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html; CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION, What You Need Know About Variants, (updated
Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/aboutvariants.html; CTR. DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION, Understanding Variants,
(updated
Aug.
6,
2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/variants/understanding-variants.html; WORLD HEALTH ORG., Tracking SARSCoV-2 Variants, (updated Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.who.int/en/activities/trackingSARS-CoV-2-variants/; Kathy Katella, Omicron, Delta, Alpha & More, YALE MED
(update July 5, 2022), https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid-19-variants-ofconcern-omicron; Elizabeth Mahase, Covid-19: What Have We Learnt About New
Variant In UK, BRIT. MED. J. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m4944;
John R. Mascola, MD, Barney S. Graham, MD, PhD & Anthony S. Fauci, MD,
SARS-CoV-2 Viral Variants—Tackling a Moving Target, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Feb.
11,
2021),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2776542?guestAccessKey=9e0c
2f1d-0a51-444d-b3a4cf1b84766df1&utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Journ
al_of_American_Medical_Association_TrendMD_1&utm_content=olf&utm_term
=021121.
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an international level may be established. A factor that contributes to
the delayed response time during public health crises, like the H1N1
outbreak or COVID-19 pandemic, is the lack of international
cooperation and cohesion.15 Therefore, this Note will also argue that
the compulsory licensing system in the United States should be
updated to match the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement system that is used on an international level.
Without a cohesive international system in place, there will always be
a divide which will continue to contribute to trade conflicts, lack of
access to patented medical technologies for low-income nations and
worsening international relations. 16
This Note will be divided into seven parts. Part II will discuss
the recent COVID-19 pandemic and how it has changed the public
views on global health and technology. Part III will explain the
background and history of patents, ultimately focusing on compulsory
licensing and how it is used as a safeguard against intellectual property
right exploitation, including patent protections that block public health
interests. Part IV will discuss the argument for strengthening
compulsory licensing procedures, including the merits of building an
internationally cohesive system. Part V will address the main
arguments against removing patent protections from public health
innovations. Part VI will analyze the issues and argue that a
compulsory licensing system serves the interests of progress and
global health by providing lifesaving medicine to lower income
15

Andrew Green, COVID-19: Countries Race Strengthen Compulsory Licensing
Legis., DEVEX (June 30, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/covid-19-countriesrace-to-strengthen-compulsory-licensing-legislation-97595; Graham Dutfield,
Coronavirus,
CONVERSATION
(July
1,
2020,
10:27
AM),
https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-it-is-morally-indefensible-for-a-nation-tokeep-life-saving-drugs-for-itself-141734; Olga Gurgula & Wen H. Lee, COVID-19,
IP
&
Access,
J.
GENERIC
MEDICINES
(June
6,
2021),
https://doi.org/10.1177/1741134321993182; Ana Santos Rutschman, How ‘Vaccine
Nationalism’ Could Block Vulnerable Pop.’s Access COVID-19 Vaccines,
CONVERSATION (June 17, 2020, 8:16 AM), https://theconversation.com/howvaccine-nationalism-could-block-vulnerable-populations-access-to-covid-19vaccines-140689.
16
Markus Overdiek & Thomas Rausch, World Class Pats. Cutting-Edge Tech.: N.
Am., BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG’S GLOB. ECON. DYNAMICS PROJECT (July 3, 2020),
https://ged-project.de/digitization-and-innovation/world-class-patents-in-cuttingedge-technologies-northamerica/#:~:text=The%20US%20%E2%80%93%20A%20class%20of,eight%20it
%20takes%20second%20place.
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nations. Ultimately, this Note will conclude that changing compulsory
licensing for public health innovations will help public health interests
internationally without negatively affecting individual and corporate
motivation to innovate and research groundbreaking solutions and
treatments.
II.

THE PANDEMIC, VACCINES, DISTRIBUTION, AND
MANUFACTURING

A significant reason that the COVID-19 pandemic dragged on
for as long as it did was the nature of the virus and its remarkable
ability to mutate and create variants. For a brief period of time at the
end of 2020, it appeared as if COVID-19 was on its way toward
becoming endemic, with the emergent variants differing only slightly
from the original strain of the virus.17 The vaccines appeared to be
working properly against the Alpha and Beta strains and it appeared
that the global and national shutdowns were a thing of the past. 18 Then,
“Endemic” means that a disease is commonly found in an area. For a pandemic to
become endemic, “enough people will gain immune protection from vaccination and
from natural infection such that there will be less transmission and much
less…hospitalization and death, even as the virus continues to circulate.” Karen
Feldscher, What Will It Be Like When COVID-19 Becomes Endemic?, HARVARD
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH
(Aug.
11,
2021),
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/what-will-it-be-like-when-covid-19becomes-endemic/; Hannah Miao, Pfizer Exec. Covid Could Become Endemic By
2024,
CONSUMER
NEWS
BUS.
CHANNEL
(Dec.
17,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/17/pfizer-executives-say-covid-could-becomeendemic-by-2024.html; Sigal Samuel, Despite Omicron, Covid-19 Will Become
Endemic,
VOX,
(Jan.
1,
2022),
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/22849891/omicron-pandemic-endemic;
CTR.
DISEASE
CONTROL
PREVENTION, Identifying Source Outbreak, (updated July 1, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/aboutepidemiology/identifying-sourceoutbreak.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus
%2F2019-ncov%2Fcases-updates%2Fabout-epidemiology%2Fidentifying-sourceoutbreak.html.
18
Hannah Beech & Livia Albeck-Ripka, Delta Variant Surges, Outbreaks Return
Many
Parts
of
the
World,
NY
TIMES
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/world/asia/virus-delta-variant-global.html;
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM, Pres. Biden Announces New Actions Protect Ams.
Against
Delta
&
Omicron
Variants
Dec.
2,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/02/factsheet-president-biden-announces-new-actions-to-protect-americans-against-thedelta-and-omicron-variants-as-we-battle-covid-19-this-winter/; Aya Alamroussi,
17
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enter Delta. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
as well as the World Health Organization (WHO) first called attention
to the Delta variant, which was initially identified in India in late
2020.19 The Delta variant threw off the course to endemic status as it
was twice as contagious as previous variants. Delta introduced the first
concerns about breakthrough infections in vaccinated individuals and
spiking cases, hospitalizations, and deaths in unvaccinated
individuals.20 In many countries, Delta launched a step back into
restrictions and mask mandates, with wealthy countries exploring
booster doses of the vaccines. 21
Delta was later overshadowed by the panic surrounding the
Omicron variant, which was initially identified in South America in
November 2021.22 Omicron is the more recent strain, and it has posed
some serious issues. First, Omicron is more transmissible than Delta
and all of the previous strains of COVID-19 thus far.23 Since more
than thirty of Omicron’s mutations are on the virus’s spike protein, part
of its enhanced transmissibility may come from its ability to evade
some immune responses, especially in individuals who were
previously infected but not vaccinated. 24 The mutations have also
Delta Variant 'Covid-19 On Steroids,' CABLE NEWS NETWORK (July 9, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/08/health/us-coronavirus-thursday/index.html; Rob
Stein, Fauci Warns Dangerous Delta Variant Greatest Threat U.S. COVID Efforts,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 22, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021/06/22/1008859705/delta-variant-coronavirus-unvaccinated-u-s-covidsurge; Delta Variant, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14; Katella,
supra note 14; Mahase, supra note 14; Mascola et al., supra note 14.
19
Delta Variant, supra note 14; Omicron Variant, supra note 14; What You Need to
Know, supra note 14; Understanding Variants, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 14; Katella, supra note 14; Mahase, supra note 14; Mascola et al.,
supra note 14.
20
Delta Variant, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14; Katella, supra
note 14; Mahase, supra note 14; Mascola et al., supra note 14.
21
Delta Variant, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14; Katella, supra
note 14; Mahase, supra note 14; Mascola et al., supra note 14.
22
Delta Variant, supra note 14; Omicron Variant, supra note 14; What You Need to
Know, supra note 14; Understanding Variants, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 14; Katella, supra note 14; Mahase, supra note 14; Mascola et al.,
supra note 14.
23
Omicron Variant, supra note 14; What You Need to Know, supra note 14;
Understanding Variants, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14;
Katella, supra note 14; Mascola et al., supra note 14.
24
Omicron Variant, supra note 14; What You Need to Know, supra note 14;
Understanding Variants, supra note 14; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14;
Katella, supra note 14; Mascola et al., supra note 14.
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changed the symptoms that have shown up in the general population
when infected with Omicron. The Omicron variant in particular has
posed some difficulty because Omicron symptoms can look similar to
a common cold in vaccinated individuals – but can still be spread by
those with mild or no symptoms. 25
The emergence of these variants demonstrated two major
points. First, that “emergency conditions” can last much longer than
the compulsory licensing system currently considers.26 Second, that
global health emergencies no longer consider borders and that
nationally divided measures will do little to stop the spread of diseases
– even with precautions and travel bans or restrictions.
Regarding the COVID-19 vaccine, many also believe that
relief from patent protection will not help the global distribution
problem.27
Instead, pharmaceutical companies, healthcare
researchers, and some governments point to low manufacturing
capacity, not patents, as the biggest impediment to global vaccination
efforts.28 This point may have held some truth in the past, but recent
developments have changed the market costs. The vaccines that have
been created thus far are complex to produce and difficult to maintain
after production. In the United States, the available vaccine brands are
Moderna, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and, as of July 2022, Novavax. 29
25

Bob Curley, Omicron Symptoms, HEALTHLINE, (Jan. 14, 2022),
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/omicron-symptoms-how-they-comparewith-other-coronavirus-variants?c=456499417593; Priya Joi, Top 5 Omicron
Symptoms Aware, GLOB. ALL. VACCINES IMMUNIZATIONS, (Jan. 18, 2022),
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/top-5-symptoms-be-aware-omicron; U. CAL.
DAVIS
HEALTH,
Omicron
Variant,
(updated
Jan.
28,
2022),
https://health.ucdavis.edu/coronavirus/covid-19-information/omicron-variant.
26
Broadly, these licenses will expire after one year or earlier if the emergency has
ended. World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO
Doc. T/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).
27
James Bacchus, Unnecessary Proposal, CATO INST. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiverintellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines#does-novel-virus-present-novelissues; William A. Reinsch et al., Compulsory Licensing, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUDIES (May 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/compulsory-licensingcure-distributing-cure; Reto Hilty et al., 10 Arguments Against Waiver Of Intell.
Prop. Rts., U. OXFORD FAC. L. (June 29, 2021), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/businesslaw-blog/blog/2021/06/10-arguments-against-waiver-intellectual-property-rights.
28
Bacchus, supra note 27; Hilty, supra note 27.
29
Mark Terry, UPDATED Comparing COVID-19 Vaccines, BIOSPACE (Oct. 8,
2021),
https://www.biospace.com/article/comparing-covid-19-vaccines-pfizerbiontech-moderna-astrazeneca-oxford-j-and-j-russia-s-sputnik-v/; WORLD HEALTH
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Outside of the United States, the AstraZeneca-University of Oxford
vaccine is widely distributed, with Novavax also being a popular
option in the European Union. 30 AstraZeneca decided to request full
approval in the U.S rather than emergency use authorization. 31 The
Moderna and Pfizer vaccines are mRNA technology-based, Johnson &
Johnson and AstraZeneca-University of Oxford vaccines use
adenovirus technology, and the Novavax COVID-19 vaccine contains
the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein and a matrix-M adjuvant.32
The mRNA technology used by Moderna and Pfizer works by
introducing a small piece of single-stranded RNA that is
complementary to a section of the virus’s genetic material. 33 The
mRNA complements a spike protein sequence, which is a protein on
the surface of the virus.34 The vaccines suspend the mRNA sequence
in a nanolipid to introduce the code to the host’s cells. 35 By
introducing the spike protein sequence to the vaccinated subject, the
body develops a response with specialized antibodies and learns to
recognize the virus ahead of time. 36 Then, if the subject comes into
contact with the virus, the body will be able to launch the antibodies
and head off severe illness.37 The potent immune response elicited
from mRNA vaccines, along with the capacity for rapid development
and potential for low-cost manufacture and safe administration, makes
them a major player in future research prospects, and of course, a major
breakthrough in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.38 The two
ORG., The Novavax Vaccine Against COVID-19: What You Need to Know, (June 13,
2022), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/the-novavax-vaccineagainst-covid-19-what-you-need-to-know.
30
Id.; Terry, supra note 29.
31
Id.
32
Id.; James Shea, Johnson & Johnson Vaccine, VCU HEALTH (May 2021)
https://www.vcuhealth.org/news/covid-19/johnson-and-johnson-vaccine-how-is-itdifferent; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA
Authorizes Emergency Use of Novavax COVID-19 Vaccine, Adjuvanted, (July 13,
2022), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid19-update-fda-authorizes-emergency-use-novavax-covid-19-vaccine-adjuvanted.
33
Terry, supra note 29; Norbert Pardi et al., MRNA Vaccines — New Era
Vaccinology, 17 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 261 (2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd.2017.243.
34
Terry, supra note 29.
35
Id.
36
Id.; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MYTHS & FACTS ABOUT COVID-19 VACCINES
(Oct. 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/facts.html.
37
Id.; Terry, supra note 29.
38
Id.; Pardi et al., supra note 33.
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mRNA vaccines boast high performance, with Moderna’s vaccine
demonstrating approximately ninety-five percent efficacy in adults in
phase III trials and Pfizer’s vaccine demonstrating ninety-five percent
immunity in phase III trials. 39 Pfizer’s vaccine received full FDA
approval on August 23, 2021, while Moderna’s vaccine received full
approval on January 31, 2022.40
The cost of manufacturing these vaccines is estimated to be
$19.50 per dose for the Pfizer brand and between $23 and $25 per dose
for the Moderna brand. 41 Since these vaccines require two doses, the
cost per individual is between approximately $39 and $50. 42 Pfizer
reported sales its COVID-19 vaccine to be $36.8 billion in 2021, and
Moderna reported $17.7 billion the sales of 807 million doses of the
vaccine in 2021.43
The initial difficulty in implementing the mRNA vaccines was
storage and shipment concerns.44 Due to the nature of the vaccine
components, namely the mRNA suspended in nano-lipids, the mRNA
vaccines needed to be stored at low temperatures. 45 Additionally, with
two doses required for the mRNA vaccines to be effective, twice the
number of doses needed to be manufactured and shipped.46 The Pfizer
vaccine was developed to be stored at negative ninety-four degrees
Fahrenheit.47 However, Moderna later revealed that its vaccine is
stable at thirty-six to forty-six degrees Fahrenheit, about the
temperature of a standard refrigerator, for up to 30 days. The Moderna
vaccine can also be stored for up to six months at negative four degrees
Fahrenheit, about the temperature of a freezer set to extra cold. 48
39

Terry, supra note 29.
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Takes Key Action by Approving Second
COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2022),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19update-fda-takes-key-action-approving-second-covid-19-vaccine; Terry, supra note
29.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.; MODERNA, supra note 12.
46
Id.; Pardi et al., supra note 33.
47
Terry, supra note 29.
48
Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Moderna COVID Vaccine Remain Stable Refrigerated
Temperatures 3 Months, CNBC HEALTH & SCI. (Apr. 29, 2021)
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/moderna-covid-vaccine-can-remain-stable-atrefrigerated-temps-for-3-months.html.
40
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Therefore, the major cost obstacles of storing and distributing an
mRNA vaccine are avoidable.
In contrast to the mRNA vaccines, the Johnson & Johnson and
AstraZeneca-University of Oxford vaccines are a disabled adenovirus
vaccine.49 It takes a different virus - not COVID-19 - that is disabled
to deliver the COVID-19 protein information to the body’s immune
system. The disabled, coded virus is detected by the immune system
to create the antibodies needed for immunity.50 Like any other
adenovirus vaccine, the Johnson & Johnson vaccine needs to be stored
in a refrigerator between thirty-six and forty-six-degrees Fahrenheit. 51
However, the CDC has stated that the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are
preferred over the Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen vaccine due to safety
concerns and lack of effectivity against some prevalent variants.52
III.

THE PATENT SYSTEM: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The current United States patent system has changed and
grown tremendously from its early beginnings. It was originally
established by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution
and was included largely through the efforts of Thomas Jefferson. 53
Ironically, Thomas Jefferson himself was an inventor and is credited
for several inventions, yet never filed a patent for a single invention. 54
He strongly opposed patents and considered them an unfair monopoly,
believing instead that knowledge should be freely available to the
public to work with and build on. 55 Indeed, the entire U.S. patent

49

Terry, supra note 29; Shea, supra note 32.
Terry, supra note 29; CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 36; Shea, supra
note 32.
51
Terry, supra note 29; Shea, supra note 32.
52
Terry, supra note 29; Shea, supra note 32; CTR. DISEASE CONTROL PREVENTION,
Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine: Overview and Safety, (updated
July 14, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/differentvaccines/janssen.html.
53
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Adam Mossof, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Pat. - Reevaluating Pat. Privilege Hist. Context, 92 CORNELL L.R.
954,
954-56
(2007),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3067&context=clr.
54
Mossof, supra note 53.
55
Mossof, supra note 53.
50
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system is predicated on the idea that humanity needs incentives to
create inventions and promote progress.56
At the height of the global AIDS crisis in 2001, governments
whose citizens were dying because they could not afford life-saving
medicines pressured the World Trade Organization (WTO) to confront
the battle between intellectual property and public health. 57 The
resulting Doha Declaration ruled that the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement) “should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health.” 58
In 2017, the TRIPS agreement was amended to improve access
to affordable medicines for developing countries lacking drug
manufacturing capacity and large-scale purchase power.59 The newly
added Article 31bis replaces a previous temporary waiver that gave the
legal basis for WTO members to grant special compulsory licenses for
the production and export of affordable generic medicines to other
members that cannot domestically produce the needed medicines in
sufficient quantities for their national need. 60
At the time of the amendment, no one could have seen what
was coming. In January 2020, the United States experienced its first
confirmed COVID-19 case and in March, the country shut down to
avoid the continued spread of the disease while further research was
done to find treatments and cures and hospitals and intensive care units
were overwhelmed with patients, often without enough space or

56

PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELL. PROP. NEW TECH. AGE: 2020 156 (2020); Brink
Lindsey, Why Intell. Prop. & Pandemics Don’t Mix, BROOKINGS INST., (June 3,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectualproperty-and-pandemics-dont-mix/; Russ Slifer, U.S. Broken Pat. Sys. Getting
Worse, THE HILL, (Aug. 14, 2019, 06:15 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/457476-the-united-states-broken-patent-system-is-getting-worse.
57
Green, supra note 15.
58
World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
T/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).
59
WORLD TRADE ORG., AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS INTELL. PROP.
RTS.
(as
amended
on
Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm; Hilary Wong,
Case Compulsory Licensing During COVID-19, 10 J. GLOB. HEALTH 010358 (2020)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7242884/; Eduardo Urias &
Shyama V. Ramani, Access Med. After TRIPS, J. INT’L BUS. POL’Y 1–18 (2020).
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7468182/.
60
WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 59.
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equipment for proper treatment.61 In December 2020, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved emergency usage authorization
of several vaccine brands in the United States, and the first COVID-19
vaccine was administered in the United States. 62 Soon after, other
nations purchased or funded vaccines, including the AstraZenecaOxford University Vaccine in the United Kingdom and Sputnik
vaccine in Russia.63 The United States and other first-world countries
were able to quickly purchase vaccines for public distribution, leaving
many third-world countries and developing nations struggling to
continue to survive the pandemic without vaccination.64
In May 2021, President Joe Biden surprised the world when he
publicly backed waiving patents on COVID-19 vaccines to allow
broad generic manufacture of the vaccines for global markets. 65 The
move simultaneously prioritized public health and put Biden directly
at odds with big pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer,
Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson.66 It also opened a debate into the
nature of patents in general and whether the theory behind patents is
the best way to drive innovation and support public health. Many are
left questioning the statutory safety measures that exist for
emergencies, including compulsory licensing.
COVID-19 is not the first nor the last public health emergency,
and it has shed light on the impact of wealth on health outcomes
globally.67 The capitalist focus of patent protection may not have a
61

CONG. RSCH. SERV., OPERATION WARP SPEED CONTS. FOR COVID-19 VACCINES
&
ANCILLARY
VACCINATION
MATERIALS
(Mar.
2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11560.
62
Terry, supra note 29.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Anshu Siripurapu, Debate Over Pat. Waiver for COVID-19 Vaccines, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (May 26, 2021) https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patentwaiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know.
66
Lindsey, supra note 56.
67
U.N.,
COVID-19
&
Hum.
Rts.,
(Apr.
2020),
https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/sites/www.un.org.victimsofterrorism/files/u
n_-_human_rights_and_covid_april_2020.pdf; Gurgula & Lee, supra note 15;
Richard Milne & David Crow, Why Vaccine ‘Nationalism’ Could Slow Coronavirus
Fight, FIN. TIMES (May 14, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/6d542894-6483446c-87b0-96c65e89bb2c; Maria Cheng & Christina Larson, Race for Virus Vaccine
Could Leave Some Countries Behind, ASSOC. PRESS (June 18, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-health-us-news-ap-top-news-virusoutbreak-4b93252bb290874c7c295cd2cb1a620c; Santos Rutschman, supra note 15;
Dutfield, supra note 15; Malik Peiris & Gabriel M. Leung, What Can We Expect
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place in the world of health as this disparity continues to grow and
more and more people die without access to life-saving technology that
cannot be widely distributed due to patent protection.68
Though the patent waiver is now backed by President Biden, it
was opposed by many Democratic and Republican politicians and
leaders in intellectual property law as it was seen as a way to
undermine intellectual property rights rather than a move to strengthen
public health.69 Additionally, a formal waiver process needs to pass
through the WTO to be globally effective and help low and mediumincome nations afford vaccine costs for free public distribution. 70
However, the WTO notoriously moves slowly, and other world powers
including the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK)
have been reluctant to support intellectual property waivers.71
From First-Gen. COVID-19 Vaccines?, LANCET (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31976-0; Nurith Aizenman, Why Low
Income Countries Short On COVID Vaccines, NAT. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 10, 2021, 7:11
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/11/10/1052078529/whylow-income-countries-are-so-short-on-covid-vaccines-hint-its-notboosters?utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=npr&u
tm_term=nprnews; Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Brazil Takes Steps Import Cheaper
AIDS Drug Under Trade Law, IP WATCH (May 7, 2007, 1:50 PM), https://www.ipwatch.org/2007/05/07/brazil-takes-steps-to-import-cheaper-aids-drug-under-tradelaw/.
68
U.N., supra note 67; Gurgula & Lee, supra note 15; Milne & Crow, supra note 67;
Cheng & Larson, supra note 67; Santos Rutschman, supra note 15; Dutfield, supra
note 15; Peiris & Leung, supra note 67; Aizenman, supra note 67; Gerhardsen, supra
note 67.
69
Siripurapu, supra note 65; Lindsey, supra note 56.
70
Green, supra note 15.
71
Siripurapu, supra note 65; Enrico Bonadio & Filippo Fontanelli, Push For COVID19 Vaccine Pat. Waiver Panacea, CONVERSATION (May 12, 2021)
https://theconversation.com/push-for-covid-19-vaccine-patent-waiver-isnt-apanacea-but-it-could-nudge-companies-to-share-160802; Bacchus, supra note 27.
In a recently published study, intellectual property experts in Nigeria were
administered a survey in which 81.2% agreed that the role of patents is to promote
innovation, but 70.6% agreed that intellectual property waivers can improve access
to COVID-19 vaccines. Obi Peter Adigwe & Davidson Oturu, The role of patent
waivers and compulsory licensing in facilitating access to COVID-19 vaccines:
Findings from a survey among healthcare practitioners in Nigeria, PUB. LIBR. SCI.
(July
7,
2022),
https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.00006
83; “This study has revealed that there is a need for intellectual property rights waiver
and compulsory licensing of all novel COVID-19 commodities including vaccines,
as this is an important strategy that can improve access to relevant products in
developing countries.” Id.
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Compulsory licensing, a provision in the TRIPS Agreement
that enables governments to supply their citizens with generic versions
of patented treatments either through domestic production or imports,
is a possible safeguard against strict patent protections in times of
global emergency, such as is the case with COVID-19.72 Title 28,
section 1498 of the United States Code acts as a compulsory licensing
statute since it allows patent owners to sue the federal government for
compensation, but not an injunction, when the government invades
their patent rights without permission. 73 In a pandemic situation like
the COVID-19 outbreak, the government might authorize a company
to manufacture patented drugs or vaccines if the patent owner is unable
to meet the full market demand or if the government deems the drug
prices to be too high. 74 Under this statute, the government cannot
nullify or forcibly transfer patent titles. 75
Compulsory licensing has the potential to help governments
avoid the obstacles of patent protection to guarantee that public health
innovations remain accessible and widely distributed. The process of
compulsory licensing can and should be changed to serve as a public
health safeguard to allow global distribution of life-saving
technology.76 However, compulsory licensing is not the only option.
Absent a patent waiver, governments around the world could also
begin to establish parallel importation schemes, which allow officials
to import and resell patented drugs, and potentially vaccines, from
another country where they may be marketed for less than the price set
by the patent holder. 77 This would be particularly useful for lowincome nations. Since the patent price has already been paid once,
these arrangements do not violate international trade regulations. 78
However, in high-income nations like the United States, this can start
WTO disputes and interrupt international relations. 79
The subsequent question, of course, then becomes why should
we who live in a wealthy nation like the United States care about low72

Wong, supra note 59; Lindsey, supra note 56.
28 U.S.C. § 1498; Kyung-Bok Son, Importance Intell. Prop. Sys. Attempting
Compulsory Licensing Pharmaceuticals, BIOMED CENT.: GLOB. HEALTH 15, 42
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-019-0485-7.
74
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 61.
75
3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. U.S., 151 Fed. Cl. 49 (Cl. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022).
76
Bonadio & Fontanelli, supra note 71; Bacchus, supra note 27.
77
Urias & Ramani, supra note 59.
78
Id.; Green, supra note 15; Siripurapu, supra note 65.
79
Urias & Ramani, supra note 59; Siripurapu, supra note 65.
73
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income countries affording medication or not – especially when many
Americans refuse to be vaccinated at all. 80 There is the honorable
argument that as world leaders, higher-income countries should look
out for lower-income countries and their well-being to encourage
equity, development, peace, and international cooperation.81
However, the more practical and realistic argument, especially
concerning COVID-19 and its continuously evolving and spreading
variants, is that no one nation will be able to buy its way out of the
pandemic and be free of the disease if other nations are still struggling
and remain unvaccinated. 82 While other nations remain plagued, no
amount of travel restrictions or quarantine time will stop the spread of
the pandemic, or its mutation, as effectively as global immunity
through vaccines.83
IV.

THE ARGUMENT FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING

Compulsory licensing is the process by which a government
may authorize production and distribution of a patented product
without the consent of the patent owner. 84 The government itself need
not be the producer or distributor and can pursue compulsory licensing
on a third party’s behalf. 85 This process has been a part of the TRIPS
agreement since its enactment in 1995 and applies to all countries that
80

Julie Bosman et al., Who Are Unvaccinated Americans?, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2021 (updated Oct. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/31/us/virusunvaccinated-americans.html. The irony of the anti-vaccination movement in the
United States while many developing nations struggle to acquire enough vaccines
for their citizens who desperately want them is too painful not to note.
81
Milne & Crow, supra note 67; Cheng & Larson, supra note 67; Rutschman, supra
note 15; “Borderless open and collaborative science and the free exchange of
knowledge and data will get us to vaccines and cures faster than by any other way.”
Dutfield, supra note 15.
82
Milne & Crow, supra note 67; Cheng & Larson, supra note 67; Rutschman, supra
note 15; Dutfield, supra note 15; Aizenman, supra note 67.
83
Rutschman, supra note 15; Dutfield, supra note 15; This is also true for vaccination
against many diseases including smallpox, measles, and polio.
84
WORLD TRADE ORG., Compulsory Licensing Pharm. & TRIPS, (2022),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm;
WORLD
TRADE ORG., Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharm. Pats. Obligations & Exceptions, (Sept.
2006),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm;
CONG. RSCH. SERV., Potential WTO TRIPS Waiver & COVID-19, (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11858.
85
WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 84; Fact Sheet, supra note 84; CONG. RSCH.
SERV., supra note 84.
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are a part of the WTO.86 The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically
list the reasons that justify the use of compulsory licensing. However,
the Doha Declaration confirms that countries are free to determine the
grounds for granting compulsory licenses and to define what
constitutes a national emergency warranting the action.87
Just as there are arguments against the limitation of intellectual
property rights through compulsory licensing and other trade
loopholes, there are arguments that support moving the intellectual
property right balance to favor public health interests more than
property rights protections. 88 The most prominent reasons for
compulsory licensing support are reduced price of and greater access
to patented goods and services that are critical for the public health of
low-income countries, while still preserving the patent rights owner’s
stake in the product following the emergency period.89 Compulsory
licenses of patents generally result in lower costs of the patented
product by allowing local manufacturers to produce the product or
service without going through the patent owner first.90 Studies place
savings at around 70% with the royalty rate granted to the patent owner
typically between 1% and 5%.91 Sometimes, even just the threat of
86

WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 84; Fact Sheet, supra note 84; CONG. RSCH.
SERV., supra note 84.
87
World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
T/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002).
88
Randall Kuhn & Reed F. Beall, Time For Pharm. Compulsory Licensing Has
Expired,
NATURE
MED.
(Aug.
6,
2012),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/230623521_The_time_for_pharmaceutica
l_compulsory_licensing_has_expired; Wong, supra note 59; Lindsey, supra note 56.
89
Urias & Ramani, supra note 59; Danielle Navarro & Marcela Vieira, Rsch.
Synthesis: Compulsory Licensing, GLOB. HEALTH CTR. GRADUATE INST., GENEVA
(Feb. 2021), https://www.knowledgeportalia.org/compulsory-licensing; Reinsch, et
al, supra note 27.
90
Urias & Ramani, supra note 59; Navarro & Vieira, supra note 89; James Packard
Love, Recent Examples Use Compulsory Licenses Pats., KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Mar. 8, 2007), https://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf;
Gerhardsen, supra note 67.
91
With even a threat of compulsory licensing, savings may sometimes higher or
lower, or discounts may be applied. Urias & Ramani, supra note 59; Navarro &
Vieira, supra note 89; Son, supra note 73; Gerhardsen, supra note 67. Negotiations
between Merck with Brazil and Thailand for the HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenz show
that the pharmaceutical companies offered their lowest prices after receiving a
compulsory license. Id.
Brazil had achieved a price for efavirenz of $580 per patient per
year earlier when it had threatened to use compulsory license. But
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compulsory license is enough to push a patent holder to work with
governments to provide better access to patented products.92 This can
be most clearly demonstrated through Pfizer’s predictions and
discussion of the pricing and distribution of its COVID-19 vaccine
after the pandemic emergency has passed. Pfizer’s Chief Financial
Officer said that “obviously,” the company is “going to get more on
price” after the “pandemic pricing environment.” 93
The
pharmaceutical company anticipates its earnings will increase from
fifteen billion dollars in 2020 to up to three to four times more after it
rescinds “pandemic pricing” and moves to continuous distribution of
booster vaccines doses.94 As of early 2021, Pfizer was charging the
U.S. $19.50 per dose, which the company noted is not a normal price;
Pfizer would typically charge anywhere from $150 to $175 per dose of
its vaccine.95 The support of the waiver and the “pandemic pricing”
conditions are factors that have pushed Pfizer to continue to allow the
vaccinations to be purchased by the government for less, thereby
allowing U.S. citizens to temporarily receive the vaccinations for free
and extend booster doses to the public. 96 While no one can say for sure
if Pfizer would have taken it upon itself to offer this reduced price
given competing vaccines and support from President Biden, it seems
very likely that the company would have skipped the “pandemic

this was too expensive compared with the price for generics
(Thailand was offered $244 per patient per year after it issued a
[compulsory license]), and thus Brazil has paid too much for too
many years . . . Id.
Additionally, few or no licenses are issued, repeated; hollow threats of use erode the
negotiating power of the compulsory license. Id.
92
Gerhardsen, supra note 67. People Over Pat.: How Govs. Preparing Make
COVID-19
Med.
Accessible,
PUB.
CITIZEN
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.citizen.org/article/people-over-patents/ (hereinafter “Pub. Citizen”).
93
Eric Sagonowsky, Pfizer Eyes Higher Prices For COVID-19 Vaccine After
Pandemic Wanes: Exec., Analyst, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 23, 2021, 12:09 PM),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/pfizer-eyes-higher-covid-19-vaccineprices-after-pandemic-exec-analyst.
94
Id.; Edited Transcript Pfizer Inc. Earnings Call Q4-2020, (Feb. 2, 2021, 3:00 PM
GMT),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_financials/2020/q4/PFEUSQ_Transcript_2021-02-02.pdf (hereinafter “Pfizer Earnings call”).
95
Id. Sagonowsky, supra note 93.
96
Id. Seemantani Sharma, A Survey Intell. Prop. Issues Between U.S. & India Under
Special
301
Report,
N.C.
J.
INT’L
L.
(2018),
https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2044&context=ncilj.
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pricing” for a bigger payout given the company leadership’s attitude
on the subject.97
The problem of pharmaceutical companies demanding more
than they are willing to accept is not just limited to the United States
or to the COVID-19 vaccines. Countries including Israel, Russia,
Chile, Ecuador, France, Germany, Brazil, Indonesia, and Canada have
issued or proposed the issuance of compulsory licenses or similar
legislative measures to ensure that COVID-19 medications and
vaccines are readily available for a lower-than-market price.98 The
price gouging that occurs between pharmaceutical companies and
governments drives higher-income countries into a frenzy where they
buy out as much stock as possible, thereby preventing lower-income
countries from being able to afford to purchase vaccine doses,
medication, or other public-health necessities.99
However, in lower income nations even the lower cost of
patented products may not be enough to utilize compulsory
licensing.100 While compulsory licensing may add force of law behind
97

Sagonowsky, supra note 93; Pfizer Earnings Call, supra note 94.
Id. Polina Ivanova, Rus. Firm Seeks Produce COVID-19 Drug Remdesivir Without
Pat., REUTERS HEALTHCARE & PHARM. (Nov. 2, 2020, 3:23 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-russia-remdesivir/russianfirm-seeks-to-produce-covid-19-drug-remdesivir-without-patentidUSKBN27I0QH; Ed Silverman, Chilean Lawmakers Support Compulsory
Licensing For Coronavirus Med. & Vaccines, STAT PHARMALOT (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/18/chile-compulsory-licensingcoronavirus-covid19-vaccines/; Ed Silverman, Ecuador Becomes Latest Country
Eye Compulsory Licensing For Covid-19 Prods., STAT PHARMALOT (Mar. 23,
2020),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/23/ecuador-compulsorylicensing-covid19-coronavirus/; PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 92.
99
Aizenman, supra note 67.
98

100

[S]ome countries fear retaliation both from other countries and
from pharmaceutical companies. In 2007, when Thailand issued its
compulsory license under Article 31, both the United States and
European Union responded by censoring the country; 35 the
United States also placed Thailand on its "Priority Watch List."
Pharmaceutical maker Abbott announced it would not apply for
licenses for seven of its new products in the Thai market, including
a heat-resistant form of the ARV. Brazil's use of compulsory
licensing was criticized by pharmaceutical companies, which
claimed that compulsory licensing would negatively affect
research for new medicines. The predictable negative reaction by
pharmaceutical companies poses obvious worries for countries.
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public need, it is not a panacea for the global health market in a
pandemic. If the vaccine were to be licensed out to governments, there
would still be difficulties with producing the vaccine in mass
quantities. A license is not all inclusive and does not allocate crucial
components for quickly making vaccines — including the actual
formulae and the technical know-how and experience. 101 Private
patent right owners and their governments have been very aggressive
towards nations that have used compulsory licensing to get a better
price for pharmaceuticals and medical technology.102 For those
nations, compulsory licensing may only bring on more issues later on,
forcing the government to choose between affording life-saving
medical technology for its citizens in the short term or maintaining
trade relations with wealthier nations in the long term.103 Though this
retaliation has not been frequently carried through, it has been an issue
of concern for several countries in the pandemic and has motivated
several nations to strengthen compulsory licensing protection and
prevent backlash later on.104
The threat of backlash can be resolved with a more unified
approach to the TRIPS Agreement and the international approach to
intellectual property rights in general. More specifically, it would
Large pharmaceutical companies bring jobs and investments to
developing countries; developing countries are thus leery.
Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success Or Failure, Measured by
Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 392 (2011),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&ar
ticle=1184&context=jipl; Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, Doha
Round's Pub. Health Legacy: Strategies For
Prod. & Diffusion Pat. Med. Under Amended TRIPS Prov., 10 J. INT’L ECON. L.
90,
952-54
(2007),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37810482_The_Doha_Round's_Public_H
ealth_Legacy_Strategies_for_the_Production_and_Diffusion_of_Patented_Medicin
es_Under_the_Amended_TRIPS_Provisions/link/0c96052803c1c2c8e3000000/do
wnload; Dina Halajian, Inadequacy TRIPS & Compulsory License, 38 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L
L.
1191,
1202
(2013),
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=bji
l.
101
Stolberg & Robbins, supra note 1.
102
Harris, supra note 100; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 100; Sharma, supra note
96; Halajian, supra note 100.
103
Harris, supra note 100; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 100; Sharma, supra note
96; Halajian, supra note 100.
104
Green, supra note 15.
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likely benefit lower income nations to have a unified approach to
compulsory licensing to reduce the risk of backlash and questions of
affordability in emergency events. Rather than taking a nation’s
compulsory license as a slight or an attempt to steal from the patent
owner, it should be taken as an attempt to preserve public health goals
and expand access where a pharmaceutical company is unwilling to
work with a government to achieve that end. After all, one of the
stipulations of TRIPS and the U.S. compulsory licensing system is that
the government must attempt to gain voluntary concession of rights
from the company before filing for the license and forcing the issue. 105
V.

PRO-PATENT ARGUMENTS: INCENTIVE FOR INNOVATION

Prior to the pandemic, in 2019, there was a bipartisan attempt
to reform Section 101 of the United States Patent Act to favor stronger
patent protections.106 At the time it was proposed, the major concern
was that the drafted bill would allow companies to own exclusive
rights to genes, thereby granting the rights to prohibit all others from
providing and developing genetic testing and pursuing research. 107
The argument was that the ambiguous clause in the current version of
Section 101 created a restrictive patent system which failed to protect,
or incentivize, groundbreaking innovations including personalized
medicine, artificial intelligence or inventions of the next
generations.108 In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, this argument
has predictably shifted to address the new hot topics. There are several
arguments against removing patent protections from public health
innovations, especially in the debate over a patent waiver for COVID19 vaccines. Pharmaceutical companies, healthcare researchers, and
some governments argue that intellectual property rules—and the
profits they allow—promote the development of breakthrough
technologies such as the COVID-19 vaccines.109 Patent law theory is
105
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based on motivating innovation with short-term monopolies on the
invention patented. The research process involved with creating
inventions can be costly and time-consuming; patent protections
reward the effort and time with a cut of the profits from the invention
with exclusive rights to use and distribution for a short length of time
- usually twenty years from the patent filing date. 110
There is concern that weakening patent right protection through
compulsory licensing or other means would eliminate or decrease the
incentives that are deemed essential to inspire the innovations that
make new medicines possible. 111 The intellectual property field strives
to achieve a balance in the trade rules, providing the global community
with sufficient flexibility to preserve intellectual property rights while
also promoting access to life‐saving medicines. 112 For short term
periods, such as during an emergency response to a pandemic,
circumventing private intellectual property rights may accelerate
distribution of goods and services, principally where the novel
knowledge that went into making them already exists.113 Considering
that the vaccines that have been created in response to the novel
COVID-19 coronavirus were made using preexisting technology, it is
not surprising that there have been some suits regarding the protected
technology used to make them. 114 Even in a global emergency,
110
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squabbles over private rights and monetary compensation have broken
out, demonstrating that the motivation for lead research and
development companies is indeed compensation, rather than helping
the state of public health.115 Therefore, in emergency situations it may
be proper and essential to avoid patent protections through uniform
compulsory licensing standards, regardless of the effect it may or may
not have on innovation incentives. For innovations not tied to
outbreaks and emergency widespread use, the undermining of private
intellectual property rights may seriously deter discovery and
development of knowledge for new goods and services that the world
needs by eliminating the monetary incentives.116
It is overly idealistic to believe that these companies will pour
time and money into innovation for the sake of a greater good without
economic incentive. Therefore, it is important to have a cohesive,
international compulsory licensing system in place to ensure that
research companies know what to expect when developing technology
for general and emergency public health use. Setting expectations for
short term need compensation and for general day-to-day
compensation will ensure that these companies continue to innovate
and work without fear of government interference in private
intellectual property rights and with reasonable expectations of
payment and distribution when cooperation is necessary in emergency
situations.117
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ANALYSIS

Considering the compelling arguments on each side of this
issue, several remain most relevant. First, it is clear that the current
patent system as applied to public health crisis response is imbalanced
with detrimental favor toward large corporations filing patents with
little to no regard for the harm to the public on a national and
international scale. 118 The lawsuits against Moderna and the open
admission by Pfizer only prove that these companies are prioritizing
profit above all else – even during a global health crisis and even when
contributing to the stop of the spread of a fatal disease could easily be
made accessible and affordable. 119 Pharmaceutical companies are
already making a healthy profit on vaccine and drug treatment sales
and yet still plan to raise the prices by over three times the amount of
“pandemic prices.”120 It is a clear abuse of power and leverage to the
detriment of public health and safety, which goes against the original
ideology and intent of patent protections.121 The goal of a patent is to
advance progress, better society with innovation and promote the
exchange of ideas.122 Even the “quid pro quo” theory of patents
recognizes that the patent filing grants a short-term monopoly in
exchange for revealing the technology behind the patent, therefore
allowing the patented product to be reproduced after the end of the
monopoly.123 What the “quid pro quo” theory does not provide for is
what happens when the twenty year monopoly comes at the cost of
human lives, and whether there is a moral responsibility of the
government to take a larger role in sponsoring and funding such lifesaving research.124
118
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Of course, then, procedures to circumvent intellectual property
protections and save lives should be used – but they should be built-in
and well established. Without such a process, multiple pharmaceutical
companies can and will take different approaches to maximizing their
pay day and will do so aggressively and quickly. 125 As pharmaceutical
companies rake in profit, the virus continues to mutate leading to
prolonged global mass death and overwhelming pressure on the
healthcare system. 126 Human health must become the focus again, and
that requires creating a faster, more flexible safeguard against patent
protections which currently prioritize big pharmaceutical company
income over public health. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed major
issues with intellectual property law from the perspective of public
health127 – but if it were not COVID-19, it likely would have been
something else. With the global spread of COVID-19 and the resulting
concern regarding public health measures and intellectual property
concerns, there is now an opportunity to fix a broken system which has
long prioritized capitalist reward over human life and health. 128
125
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Second, the use of compulsory licensing on a large scale is
likely the most successful solution to the imbalance within the patent
system. Compulsory licensing already exists on an international level
through the WTO TRIPS agreement to facilitate access to critical
medicine where intellectual property protections are a barrier. 129 The
global community briefly came together in 2020 to work on creative
solutions to circumvent the intellectual property protections and ensure
information sharing.130 Many other globally-spread diseases have an
attached social stigma and unfortunately did not promote this level of
international cooperation with HIV, AIDS, and diabetes as prime
examples.131 However, COVID-19 was a unique circumstance for that
level of cooperation – and it did not last very long once it became clear
that equity measures were still not ensuring vaccination and
pharmaceutical access to low income nations. 132 In 2009 the H1N1
influenza133 pandemic resulted in developed countries scrambling to
place large advance orders of vaccines – just in case.134 Wealthy
nations bought practically all the output the vaccine companies could
manufacture in a move of mutual greed – the companies gaining fast
profit, and the nations gaining more bargaining power - and thus drove
the price up while depriving low-income nations of the much needed
vaccines.135 With COVID-19, similar buy-outs of medical supplies by
wealthy countries, including vaccines, personal protective equipment,
respirators, and medical treatments, all occurred again, as if none of
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the countries learned anything from the 2009 H1N1 influenza
outbreak.136 Using compulsory licensing procedures for treatments
and preventative medications can prevent price-gouging by
pharmaceutical companies by forcing negotiations with less wealthy,
developing government entities and speed up the availability and
distribution of vaccines to therefore avoid the lethal consequences. 137
Strengthening the system to be uniform, flexible, and sensitive to truly
global emergency events would only serve to ensure that nations with
less power and money have a clear path to access new innovations in
the public health market. Without such a uniform system in place, it
is likely that the next health crisis will follow a similar pattern of
massive over-purchasing by rich nations and lack of access for poor
nations.
Third, compulsory licensing itself is insufficiently structured,
leaving gaps in global protection and response to major health issues
including viral pandemics like COVID-19 and HIV. Through the
COVID-19 pandemic, it became clear that there was a stark divide
between nations that have power and those that do not. Those with
buying power will not hesitate to leave global neighbors behind in a
global health struggle.138 As of now, the most vaccinated nation in the
world by percent of population in compliance is The United Arab
Emirates, most likely due to its strategic and intensive vaccination
compliance program and vaccine hoarding, which was driven toward
ensuring its residents were vaccinated quickly with strict measures in
place.139 However, the most telling information comes from the
vaccine acquisition contracts. 140 Wealthy nations and global powers
including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the
European Union, Australia, and Japan, purchased excess vaccines - up
136
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to three times the amount to completely vaccinate the citizens in those
nations.141 Meanwhile, poor nations were forced to under-purchase
what is needed for their citizens, leading to an international pattern of
wealthier individuals being vaccinated at a higher rate than poor
individuals regardless of national origin or vaccine cost.142
The compulsory licensing process and requirements should be
altered to include a more flexible period and to address not just
emergencies but larger public health issues as well. At any given
moment, the world can be shut down by a new deadly illness without
warning. Without adequate access to life-saving medical treatments
and vaccines, hundreds of thousands, even millions, may die. 143 This
will support progress and innovation better than the patent system,
which is based on capital reward and monopoly after Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) application acceptance. 144
Additionally, the global border-bound, piece-meal approach to
compulsory licensing systems is outdated in a world where a virus can
reach pandemic status in a matter of weeks.145 Variants that are
discovered oceans away reach the United States and Europe almost as
quickly as they are reported, at least partially because travel
restrictions and airline mask mandates are insufficient when
141
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individuals and governments fail to take responsible actions to prevent
spread and continue to travel internationally. 146 In an ideal world, with
a centralized global health emergency response system in place based
on the concept behind compulsory licensing, scientific advancements
as well as purchasing and distribution would be universally shared with
proportionate cost-sharing and allocation based on population. Private
pharmaceutical companies and innovators could negotiate and deal
with a globally unified front for truly global emergencies to ensure
such egregious inequity in global response, and therefore a faster
journey to the end of the emergency. Without such a system, it is likely
that another global health emergency could cripple the global
economy, block travel, and unravel the world as we know it like the
COVID-19 pandemic achieved. Additionally, a unified system could
potentially serve to bridge the gap in access to technology and
innovations in times of emergency, which was demonstrated in the
patterns of COVID-19 vaccine purchases internationally. 147
VII.

CONCLUSION

Patent protections for innovations that support public health
can have a major damaging effect on society by limiting manufacturing
and price-gouging consumers. It is in the best interest of progress and
humanity to eliminate patent protections on life-saving public health
innovations during times of emergency. The world of public health on
the global stage has changed dramatically in the past two decades, and
it is time for the patent system to reflect that change. Without further
safeguards against price gouging by pharmaceutical companies and
stockpiling by wealthy nations, the risk of detrimental global
pandemics and mass death will only increase. It is time for a
collaborative, unified, internationally recognized system.
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